The tobacco industry and its allies often attack tobacco control measures as paternalistic efforts that violate smokers' rights and interfere with individual liberty. Although these arguments have no constitutional or other legal basis, they still have considerable rhetorical and persuasive power. Those who resort to "nanny state" and "health Nazi" name-calling likely cannot be turned. But logic and rational analysis can prevent others from accepting these ethics-based attacks as valid. That is why articles that clearly and convincingly rebut these arguments, such as the one in this issue by Morain and Malek, are so helpful and important. 1 The article carefully and respectfully considers the claim that those aged 18 to 20 years have some kind of ethical right or liberty interest to purchase and consume tobacco products. But it then explains why raising the minimum age for legal sales of cigarettes and other smoked tobacco products from 18 to 21 years is still fully appropriate, not just to promote public health, but also from an ethical perspective that values individual liberty and personal autonomy.
That is as far as the article itself goes, although its implications reach much further. The article's analysis directly supports a reasoned conclusion that much more aggressive antismoking measuressuch as minimizing nicotine levels in smoked tobacco products or raising their minimum sales age annually by an additional year until their legal market disappears-also would not unduly restrict individual liberty and would be ethically appropriate.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR ETHICAL ANALYSES
Although the article uses more qualified and tentative language and has a more limited scope, it suggests the following considerations in any ethical analysis of whether an intervention to reduce smoking harms might excessively restrict individual liberty. By themselves, these considerations indicate that almost any effective measure to reduce smoking harms directed solely at the tobacco industry would not excessively or unethically infringe on individual liberty. But Morain and Malek suggest that it might be ethically inappropriate to seriously impede the ability of people already addicted to smoking to obtain the smoked tobacco products they desire to feed their addictions (e.g., by abruptly increasing the minimum sales age instead of phasing it in). This ethical concern should largely disappear, however, if the antismoking measures leave smokers with other readily available legal ways to obtain and consume the nicotine they crave that are attractive or at least acceptable to smokers (e.g., via e-cigarettes or other products for inhaling nicotine).
The article also states that a tobacco control measure that restricts individual liberty might not be ethically appropriate if there is "a less restrictive alternative that could achieve a similar public health benefit." 1(p1404) This standard works well to the extent that it means that the measures should be modified to minimize any liberty restrictions whenever that can be done without significantly reducing the health gains they secure. But its broader literal application could be unethical. For example, if an otherwise ethical tobacco control measure that restricted individual liberty would reduce smoking harms by 10%, and a different, less-restrictive measure would also secure a 10% reduction, it would not be ethical to replace the first with the second. The most ethical approach would be to implement both measures to maximize overall health gains. It would be ethical to substitute the less-liberty-restricting tobacco control measure for the other only if implementing both were not necessary to minimize smoking harms as quickly as possible. However, BRFSS is limited by the number of questions that can be asked, the self-reported nature of the data, the lack of clinical data, declining response rates, and reductions in funding.
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